The Sound of Music: Externalist Style by Kersten, Luke & Wilson, Robert A.
American Philosophical Quarterly
Volume 53, Number 2, April 2016
©2016 by the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois
THE SOUND OF MUSIC,  
EXTERNALIST STyLE
Luke Kersten and Robert A. Wilson
Abstract
Philosophical exploration of individualism and externalism in the cognitive sciences most recently 
has been focused on general evaluations of these two views. This paper returns to broaden an earlier 
phase of the debate by investigating music cognition as one area in the cognitive sciences that might 
benefit from externalist theorizing. It is argued that individualism has acted as a kind of paradigm for 
research within music cognition, limiting its theoretical and explanatory horizons. To counter these 
individualistic tendencies, externalist alternatives are outlined, and a qualified form of externalism 
about music cognition is offered.
1. INTRODUCTION
Internalism or individualism about the mind 
can be formulated in a variety of ways, all 
of which express the idea that psychology in 
general, and cognition in particular, is con-
cerned, in Hilary Putnam’s (1975) original 
phrase, with what is “in the head.” Putnam’s 
focus was on a particular view of meaning 
that stretched from Frege’s and Russell’s 
accounts of reference in natural language 
through Carnap’s view of epistemic recon-
struction in the Aufbau to then- dominant 
views in the philosophy of language and 
metaphysics. The view that Putnam was cri-
tiquing about meaning was shortly thereafter 
articulated and defended as a broad research 
program in cognitive psychology and the 
cognitive sciences more generally under the 
heading of “methodological solipsism” by 
Jerry Fodor (1980), and acquired the name 
“individualism” in the work of Tyler Burge 
(1979), who identified an overall conception 
of the mind prevalent in modern philosoph-
ical thinking at least since Descartes in the 
seventeenth century, one that he thought was 
mistaken.
 Although Putnam, Fodor, and Burge were 
all concerned, in one way or another, with 
intentionality and mental states that had some 
kind of content, Burge in particular saw at 
least part of the significance of challenging 
individualism in broader terms, both ori-
ginally noting that the “sense in which man 
is a social animal runs deeper than much 
mainstream philosophy of mind has acknow-
ledged” (Burge 1979, p. 117) and going on to 
take on individualistic views in the heartland 
of cognitive science by arguing that David 
Marr’s (1982) computational theory of vision 
was non- individualistic (Burge 1986). Views 
that rejected internalism or individualism 
were called “externalist.”
 Moving beyond the rejection of inter-
nalism, externalist views of the mind have 
themselves taken a variety of forms, and have 
been intermingled more than alphabetically 
(and at times confusingly) with views of the 
mind and cognition that are “embedded,” 
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“embodied,” and “extended” (Clark 1997; 
Wilson 2004; Shapiro 2011; Wilson and 
Foglia 2011; Foglia and Wilson 2013). What 
externalist views share more positively is 
an embrace of the idea that the integration 
of cognition with bodily and environmental 
structures is central to the study of cognition.
 Putting aside group- level and other forms 
of distributed cognition (Wilson 2004, chaps. 
11–12; Huebner 2014), the most radical form 
of externalism about the individual mind is 
the extended cognition thesis, which holds 
that at least some cognitive processing phys-
ically extends beyond the bodily boundary of 
the individual to incorporate some aspect of 
that individual’s environment. Beginning as 
wide functionalism (Harman 1988) and wide 
computationalism (Wilson 1994; 1995, chap. 
3), the idea of extended cognition gained 
influence through Andy Clark and Dave Chal-
mers’s paper in Analysis (Clark and Chalmers 
1998). Moving from discussions dominated 
by thought experiments and considerations 
of metaphysical possibility to actual experi-
mental research and methodological engage-
ment with the practice of cognitive science, 
the literature on extended cognition has con-
stituted a growth industry in the philosophy 
of mind and cognitive science over the past 
fifteen years (Arnau et al. 2014; Carter et al. 
2014; Menary 2010; Wilson 2014).
 Philosophical exploration of individualism 
and externalism in the cognitive sciences, par-
ticularly of extended cognition, most recently 
has been focused on general evaluations of 
these two views (Adams and Aizawa 2008; 
Rupert 2009; Clark 2008), including the 
identification of corresponding views in a 
broader range of sciences referred to some-
what whimsically as the “fragile sciences” 
(Wilson 2004, 2005b), which include the cog-
nitive, biological, and social sciences. Some 
of that exploration has discussed parallels 
between individualistic or internalist theses 
in these distinct philosophical literatures 
(Wilson 2004, chap. 1; 2005b); some of it 
has linked up discussions of individual minds 
and agency with group minds and collective 
agency (Wilson 2004, chaps. 11–12; 2005a; 
Theiner 2011; Huebner 2014).
 Since internalism has been viewed as im-
posing a putative constraint on cognition and 
its study, one governing all of cognition and 
the mind, externalist challenges are typical-
ly challenges to its hegemony. Or, in plain 
speak, and in terms of the radical form of 
externalism expressed by the extended cog-
nition thesis, externalists challenge the claim 
that all of cognition is, or is best studied as 
if it were, located entirely inside the head or 
inside the bodily envelope. For this reason, 
a productive way to advance debate between 
individualists and externalists is to focus 
on particular domains of cognition, such as 
music cognition.
 Thus here we return to broaden an earlier 
phase of the debate between individualists 
and externalists about cognition, one that 
considered in detail particular theories, 
such as those in developmental psychol-
ogy (Patterson 1991), the computational 
theory of vision (Burge 1986; Segal 1989), 
and form perception (Wilson 1994; 1995, 
chap. 3). Where does the empirical work 
of most relevance to this debate sit? Since 
internalism and individualism have been 
dominant research paradigms in psychology 
and the cognitive sciences since the demise 
of behaviorism in the 1960s, much existing 
work conforms to, expresses, and embraces 
an individualistic view of cognition. Music 
cognition, the domain that we will focus on 
here, is no exception, despite being an area 
in the cognitive sciences that has received 
little attention from philosophers—though it 
has recently been thrown into the externalist 
spotlight (Cochrane 2008; Krueger 2014; 
Kersten 2014). Given that individualism 
can be thought of as a kind of paradigm for 
research on cognition, we provide a brief 
overview of the field of music cognition and 
individualistic tendencies within the field 
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(sections 2 and 3) before turning to consider 
externalist alternatives to individualistic para-
digms (sections 4 and 5) and then arguing for 
a qualified form of externalism about music 
cognition (section 6).
2. MUSIC COGNITION
 The study of music cognition has many 
strands. Rather than attempting to do justice 
to all of its rich work here, we instead provide 
a brief overview of music cognition based on 
some of its prominent figures. This approach 
should help to highlight both some of the 
details and larger themes of research.
 There are two sets of figures that loom 
large in the study of music perception: Carol 
Krumhansl and associates (Krumhansl 1983, 
1990; Krumhansl and Shepard 1979; Krum-
hansl and Kessler 1982) and Fred Lerdahl 
and Ray Jackendoff (Lerdahl and Jackendoff 
1983; Jackendoff and Lerdahl 2006). Each set 
of researchers has exerted notable influence 
on the field, albeit in different ways. The first 
has created an experimental benchmark for 
research; the other has probably provided the 
most wide- reaching and substantive analysis 
of music cognition to date. Let’s take each in 
turn.
 First, Krumhansl’s research has had an 
unrivaled pre- eminence in the study of music 
perception. John Sloboda, for instance, has 
noted that Krumhansl and associates are the 
most cited authors in music cognition, author-
ing three of the top ten papers of the last thirty 
years (Sloboda 2005, p. 118). As a program of 
research, Krumhansl’s work has largely been 
focused on tonality in music cognition, that 
is, on how certain pitch patterns come to be 
identified by listeners as the key of a musical 
piece. Part of the motivation for Krumhansl’s 
research has been to provide experimental 
verification of certain theoretical notions 
about tonal relationships from music theory 
(Sloboda 2005). To investigate tonal relation-
ships, Krumhansl and associates have used an 
experimental paradigm called the “tone probe 
method.” In this method, musical contexts 
are established by playing partial scales or 
chords, followed by probes, which can take 
the form of notes or chords. Subjects are then 
asked to rate how well the probes fit with the 
musical contexts, for example, rate how well 
they complete the partial scales, usually on a 
number scale. The experimental design aims 
to reveal how cognitive elements interact with 
key context or tonal relationships.
 To take a specific example, Krumhansl and 
Shepard (1979) had subjects listen to a C ma-
jor scale or triad, followed by a pair of tones 
randomly selected from the C major scale. 
Subjects then had to rate how well the paired 
tones compared with the tonic, being the pitch 
around which other pitches are arranged (for 
example, the tonic of a C scale is the C). The 
results showed that subjects tended to rate 
those tones as most similar that were closer 
to the C, for example, C- E- G. Moreover, in 
a follow- up experiment, where the same task 
design was used but the stimuli were changed 
to include a pattern of eight interpolated tones 
and a final comparison tone, subjects found 
it easier to remember the diatonic standard 
tones—the interference was less significant 
for the diatonic interpolated tones than for the 
non- diatonic tones. For Krumhansl and asso-
ciates, such studies reveal that perceptions of 
similarity, with or without interference, tend 
to group around the tonic key.
 These findings vindicated the traditional 
music theory view that tones nearest to the 
tonic are the most stable (Sloboda 2005). This 
led Krumhansl (1990) to hypothesize that, 
within any given musical context, individual 
pitches are perceived inside a hierarchy of 
tonal organization. Listeners use an internal 
representation of a tonal hierarchy to structure 
music perception. This geometric approach 
to understanding music perception exerted a 
tremendous influence on the research agenda 
of the 1980s and 1990s. As Sloboda (2005) 
points out, researchers became focused on 
teasing out and testing the details of the tonal 
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hierarchy in light of Krumhansl’s initial re-
sults.
 In contrast to Krumhansl, Lerdahl and Jack-
endoff pursued their research in closer connec-
tion to linguistics, focusing more on structural 
analysis than on experimentation. Drawing 
on underdetermination considerations from 
Chomskyan linguistics, Lerdahl and Jackend-
off (1983) argued that the structures of music 
are too complex and sophisticated to be ex-
plained by acoustics properties alone. For this 
reason, they claimed that an innate, universal 
“musical grammar” is needed to account for 
listeners’ intuitions. This universal grammar, 
according to Lerdahl and Jackendoff, supplies 
the additional information otherwise absent 
in the acoustic stimuli. Within the constraints 
imposed by this grammar, music listeners use 
and refine sets of musical rules to understand 
and perceive music.
 Lerdahl and Jackendoff took musical 
grammar to consist of two types of rules, 
what they call the well- formedness and the 
preference rules. Well- formedness rules de-
fine the formal structures possible for musical 
structures, while preference rules specify 
the probable structures according to which 
listeners assign or organize music stimuli. 
One well- formedness rule, for instance, is 
that any contiguous sequence of pitch events 
could constitute a group (Lerdahl and Jack-
endoff 1983, p. 37). Using this rule, musical 
surfaces are parsable into the structures lis-
teners normally hear or understand. To illus-
trate, consider Mozart’s Sonata K. 331. For 
Lerdahl and Jackendoff, the well- formedness 
rules offer two different configurations of this 
piece: call them groupings A and B. Listeners 
might emphasize either grouping because, as 
far as structural descriptions go, each is well 
formed. As a result, any difference found 
between the two groupings from the listener’s 
perspective is attributable to a difference in 
preference rules. In this way, understanding 
Mozart’s Sonata is the product of organizing 
sound events according to formal principles, 
analogous to how children might parse nat-
ural language using the universal grammar 
of generative linguistics. Listeners structure 
musical events using the well- formedness 
rules and then use the preference rules to 
decide between the various configurations. 
Musical grammar generates the musical 
phenomenon for the listener.
 The impact of Lerdahl and Jackendoff’s 
approach has been sizable. In the first place, 
it represented the first comprehensive attempt 
to analyze music cognition in a music- 
theoretically plausible way. Researchers have 
since extended Lerdahl and Jackendoff’s 
account computationally (e.g., Temperley 
2001). Second, it prompted serious consider-
ation of the relationship between language 
and music. Although rough parallels had 
been drawn since the time of Helmholtz 
(1863/1954), Lerdahl and Jackendoff’s ap-
propriation of tools from generative linguis-
tics indicated to many that real theoretical 
progress could be made if consideration was 
given to the relationship between music and 
language, not just in the abstract but methodo-
logically as well. This included, for example, 
developing new lines of research based on 
developmental approaches to language (see, 
e.g., Honing et al. 2009).
 To round out the discussion, we conclude 
with research on music skill and performance, 
particularly the work of Carol Palmer (Palmer 
1988, 1997; Palmer and Pfordresher 2003). 
The reason for this is that Palmer’s work has 
been particularly influential in opening up 
the landscape of music cognition beyond the 
perceptual and cognitive interests that dom-
inated the 1970s and 1980s. As evidenced by 
the research programs of authors like Krum-
hansl, for much of its history, music cognition 
took its domain to largely include only those 
processes that underlie the human ability 
to understand music. Palmer’s research, 
however, helped to show the importance of 
cognitive elements on musical behavior more 
generally.
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 One aspect of musical behavior that has 
particularly attracted Palmer’s interest has 
been musical performance. For example, 
Palmer and associates have shown that, con-
trary to what had often been assumed (cf. van 
Galen and Wing 1984), musical performers 
do not prepare long complex sequences of 
music before production; rather, they tend 
to partition musical units into shorter sub-
sequences. By using an eye–hand span task, 
Palmer showed, for instance, that pianists 
better recall segments of music when they 
fit within short- term memory constraints 
(Palmer 2003, p. 157). Such findings have 
been further vindicated by developmental 
studies that show that, as performers get bet-
ter, they also move from segmenting music 
into larger units to breaking them down into 
smaller segments.
 Among others, Palmer’s work has also been 
influential in emphasizing the importance of 
internal timing mechanisms. Palmer (1988), 
for example, showed that performers used in-
ternal clocks to regulate and coordinate differ-
ent parts of performance, whether individual 
or ensembles. By contrasting performances of 
musical rhythms against different tempi, she 
revealed that performers were more accurate 
when reproducing musical rhythms that re-
sembled simple ratios such as the ones found 
in physical motions like walking than ones 
that were more musically important (e.g., 1:1 
or 2:1 vs. 3:2 or 4:3). Additionally, Palmer has 
also shown that timing mechanisms are sen-
sitive to cognitive constraints such as those 
found in working memory (Palmer 1997).
 Several themes emerge from this brief 
survey of music cognition. For one, by and 
large, researchers have been concerned with 
the subconscious processes that underlie 
music abilities and perception. What’s more, 
the overarching research program has been to 
find the underlying cognitive regularities that 
connect the largest swath of music. As we will 
see, these tendencies are not accidental. They 
are part and parcel with a larger paradigm 
of thought that research has been conducted 
within. With these themes in mind, we turn 
next to see how internalism has found its way 
into music cognition.
3. INDIVIDUALISTIC TENDENCIES 
IN MUSIC COGNITION
 It is no coincidence that the rise of music 
cognition coincides with the rise of cognitive 
psychology, and cognitive science more gen-
erally. The advent of the cognitive revolution 
brought with it a certain way of conceptual-
izing the nature of cognition (Burge 1979; 
Fodor 1980). In this section, we identify one 
particular paradigm of thought about the 
mental that has exerted particular influence 
on music cognition research: internalism 
or individualism. Drawing on some of the 
previously outlined research, we highlight 
how internalism has acted as a sort of para-
digm for research, limiting the theoretical 
and explanatory horizons of researchers. We 
begin by outlining the core suppositions of 
internalism.
 There are three main assumptions of inter-
nalism. First, in keeping with Fodor’s original 
“methodological individualism,” internalism 
is a view about how cognition should be 
studied. It holds that what is explanatorily 
and taxonomically important is that cognitive 
processes play certain roles within individ-
uals’ internal mental economy. Burge (1986) 
summarizes this dimension of internalism 
nicely when he writes that “[a]ccording to 
individualism [internalism] about the mind, 
the mental natures of all a person’s or ani-
mal’s mental states (and events) are such that 
there is no necessary or deep individuative 
relation between the individual’s being in 
states of those kinds and the nature of the 
individual’s physical or social environments” 
(pp. 3–4). For internalism, when it comes to 
cognition, external factors, such as features 
of the physical environment, are beside the 
point. This “methodological assumption” 
stems, in part, from concerns about the need 
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to individuate mental states by causal powers 
(Wilson 1995, chaps. 2–4). Since two organ-
isms can have different output with respect 
to the same input, if psychology is to make 
projectable generalizations, so the thought 
goes, its individuative practices need to be 
sensitive to the internal causal properties that 
make the difference.
 Second, internalism stakes a claim on 
where cognition is located. Cognitive states, 
it is said, supervene on only the intrinsic, 
physical properties of individuals. The types 
of physical properties that fix mental or cog-
nitive states are wholly internal to the indi-
vidual. As Devitt writes, “[o]nly something 
that is entirely supervenient on what is inside 
her skin—on her intrinsic internal physical 
state, particularly her brain—could play the 
required explanatory role between peripheral 
input and output” (1990, p. 377). As hinted 
at by the Devitt quote, the reasoning some-
times offered for this view is that internal 
supervenience provides the best chance of 
making sense of psychological explanations 
(Fodor 1987). We might call this internalism’s 
“metaphysical assumption.”
 Third, and finally, internalism makes a 
claim about how cognition works. Since 
people can think and act independent of what 
is present in the local environment, what 
matters for psychological studies is how 
people represent the world, not how the world 
actually is. As Bach writes, “[r]egardless of 
how the world is in comparison to how it is 
represented as being and regardless of how 
it may change while the person’s psycho-
logical states remain the same, everything is 
the same as far as [internalist] psychology is 
concerned (1982, p. 123). For internalism, 
cognitive states are causally potent, manipu-
lable internal information- bearing structures, 
that is, organizations or arrangements of 
physical properties that allow information 
to be carried. Call this the “operational as-
sumption.”
 These three assumptions act in concert to 
form a kind of paradigm for research, one that 
has implicitly exerted an influence on music 
cognition. To illustrate, we return to the work 
of Krumhansl and of Lerdahl and Jackendoff 
and see the role played by the internalist as-
sumptions. We take it that similar comments 
apply to Palmer’s work as well, along with 
much of music cognition more generally.
 First, consider Krumhansl’s methodology. 
She writes: “It is essential to control irrelevant 
properties of the stimulus, and to change or 
manipulate only those of interest. Potentially 
separable properties must not be experiment-
ally covaried or confounded if the pattern of 
response is to be interpreted unambiguously” 
(1990, p. 8). What’s interesting about how 
Krumhansl conceives of her approach is that 
the “irrelevant properties” are external to lis-
teners and their “interpretation” requires them 
to be held constant. Notice, though, that if this 
is true, then Krumhansl’s methodology is in 
step with the methodological assumption of 
internalism. The environmental facts are only 
relevant insofar as they influence organisms’ 
current internal physical states.
 Second, consider how Krumhansl con-
ceives of the role of the tonal hierarchy within 
music perception: “[L]isteners, at least those 
with a moderate level of experience with 
tonal music, have apparently internalized 
this aspect of musical structures and use this 
knowledge to encode and remember pitches” 
(Krumhansl 1983, p. 43). Because sound 
patterns are too “improvised” and “unorgan-
ized,” the tonal hierarchy must be internal 
to the listener. Krumhansl’s emphasis on in-
ternalization points to the musical structures 
being realized by wholly in- the- head physical 
states. If the tonal hierarchy is not a musical 
property but rather a psychologically imposed 
organization of musical elements, then it has 
to be internal to the listener.
 Finally, recall that Krumhansl conceived 
of the tonal hierarchy as an “internal 
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representation”; it was for this reason it could 
be compared to incoming stimuli and used in 
making judgments about music. However, 
notice that if the tonal hierarchy acts as a 
template or scheme during music perception, 
then it is an internal, information- bearing 
structure. It carries information about tonal 
relationships.
 Similar considerations apply to Lerdahl and 
Jackendoff’s generative theory. First, notice 
that in order to allow inferences about well- 
formedness and preference rules, Lerdahl 
and Jackendoff hold that the environmental 
variables (musical stimuli) need to be held 
constant. This presupposes that Lerdahl and 
Jackendoff accept some version of the meth-
odological assumption behind internalism. 
Furthermore, Lerdahl and Jackendoff’s talk 
of the “mind/brain” underlying musical cog-
nition is suggestive of the metaphysical as-
sumption. They write: “The musical capacity 
constitutes the resources in the human mind/
brain that make it possible for a human to 
acquire the ability to understand music in any 
of the musical idioms of the world, given the 
appropriate input” (Jackendoff and Lerdahl 
2006, p. 35). This highlights a commitment 
to musical structures supervening wholly 
on internal physical states of the individual. 
Finally, because the musical grammar sup-
plies the information required to compensate 
for the improvised musical input, it qualifies 
as information- bearing structure—the third 
operational assumption of internalism.
 Taken as representative examples, Krum-
hansl’s and Lerdahl and Jackendoff’s research 
helps to illustrate that internalist assumptions 
have directed central and influential work in 
music cognition. However, the internalist 
assumptions do more than this: internalism 
has also implicitly limited the theoretical and 
explanatory horizons of researchers. To see 
how, consider two alternative approaches 
to understanding the target of Krumhansl’s 
research, tonal processing.
 The first, in step with Krumhansl’s own 
research, emphasizes the presence of internal 
representations, ones that supply and guide 
the perception of tonal structure. The second 
eschews internalism and looks to understand 
tonal processing more as the reliable detec-
tion and exploitation of invariant structure 
already present within complex patterns of 
pitch and rhythm. The second of these two 
approaches, however, has not been suffi-
ciently appreciated or explored because the 
internalist assumptions we have identified 
have restricted what researchers properly 
think of as cognitive. Researchers such as 
Krumhansl assume that cognitive processing 
must take a certain internalist form—for ex-
ample, to operate only via external inputs and 
internal representations—and then carry out 
research without the full range of alternatives 
available. This is why the information of the 
tonal hierarchy must be “internalized” and 
“highly structured.” Cognition must be inter-
nal and representational. Because internalism 
has acted as a sort of paradigm of research, 
music cognition has left certain theoretical 
and experimental avenues unexplored. In the 
next section, we look to open up the concep-
tual space for a more externalist approach to 
music cognition.
4. EXTERNALISM CALLING: 
PrimA FAcie CONSIDERATIONS
 Despite the individualistic tendencies in 
music cognition, there are several reasons 
to think that the study of the perception and 
performance of music is likely to be enhanced 
by externalist perspectives that depart from 
the exclusive focus on in- the- head processing. 
Here, we appeal to some general characteriz-
ations of research in other cognitive domains 
that have been fruitfully explored from an 
externalist perspective, particularly one that 
invokes the extended cognition thesis.
 First, when there are mind–world constan-
cies that facilitate the off- loading of cognitive 
APQ 53_2 text.indd   145 2/9/16   10:20 AM
146  / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLy
processing from mind to world, such that 
parts of the world can either substitute for or 
even replace more costly internal process-
ing, the prospects for extended cognition 
become ergonomically and functionally vi-
able. Mind–world constancies together with 
an organism’s ability to make use of these 
at least sometimes leads to what elsewhere 
one of us has called exploitative representa-
tion in its computational repertoire (Wilson 
2004, pp. 162–172; cf. also Shapiro 1997), 
whereby features of one’s environment serve 
functionally as cognitive resources, in place 
of internal representation. When exploitative 
representation and “wide computationalism” 
(Wilson 1994) are cognitively cheaper than 
internal representation crunching, extended 
cognition abides by what Andy Clark called 
the “007 principle”: “Know only as much as 
you need to know to get the job done” (Clark 
1989, p. 64).
 Second, extended cognition is facilitated 
when perception- action cycles that involve a 
body moving through an informationally rich 
environment over time generate, and thus 
physically constitute, cognitive processing. 
Although, traditionally, perception has been 
thought of as providing input to downstream 
cognitive processing, which in turn feeds 
behavioral output, there are reasons to resist 
this “cognitive sandwich” view (Hurley 
1998, 2001). Sensing and moving are more 
integral to one another than many modular 
views of cognition have allowed, and their 
integration through perception- action cycles 
is more pronounced in some domains than in 
others.
 Music cognition possesses both of these 
features. As we will see in sections 5 and 6, 
there are a number of mind–world constan-
cies, and ways in which sensing and moving 
through one’s informationally rich environ-
ment are integrated in both the perception and 
performance of music that provide motivation 
to take externalism about music cognition 
seriously.
5. RECENT EXTERNALIST 
TENDENCIES IN MUSIC 
COGNITION
 From our previous discussion, one might 
get the impression that music cognition has 
almost exhaustively been an internalist affair. 
And although this has certainly predomin-
antly been the case, there have been pockets 
of externalist- inspired work that bucks the 
internalist picture of mind. In this section, we 
identify some of the externalist tendencies in 
music cognition. We divide discussion into 
two parts: externalist research and recent 
philosophical work.
 First, we consider two examples of re-
search in music cognition with affinities 
to externalism. In the mid- 1980s and early 
1990s, Gerald Balzano was in some ways 
a lone dissenter to the prevailing internalist 
paradigm. Like many researchers, Balzano 
was interested in how untrained adult music 
listeners perceived music; unlike other re-
searchers, Balzano took his experimental and 
theoretical lead from non- internalist sources. 
Following the work of Gibson (1966, 1986) in 
ecological psychology, Balzano approached 
the study of music cognition not as a project 
of investigating how organisms process and 
construct internal representations, but rather 
as a project of investigating how they lean on 
and exploit their environment. In this way, 
Balzano’s research (1980, 1982, 1986) was 
an important forerunner to recent externalist 
theorizing and research that emphasises how 
organisms distribute and off- load cognitive 
work (e.g., Clark 1997; Wilson 2004).
 Balzano’s views were developed through 
several studies (1980, 1982, 1986). To take a 
specific example, in one set of experiments, 
he had subjects listen to thirty- eight pseudo- 
melodies and then decide whether they were 
more or less musical. The participants heard 
pseudomelodies that were either constructed 
with pitch pairs of identical rhythm and 
different pitch or time pairs with identical 
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pitch and different rhythm. Balzano then 
compared the pitch- time value relationships 
across several conditions. The design of the 
study meant that Balzano measured listeners’ 
responsiveness to “invariant musical struc-
tures” of the different pitch- time constraints. 
What Balzano found was that, in conditions 
where there were more pitch- time constraints, 
perception of the musicality of the pseudo-
melodies was highest (Balzano 1986, p. 
227). This suggested that listeners directly 
interacted with the higher- order structures 
of the pseudomelodies. The complexity and 
immediateness of the musical information 
made it unlikely that listeners were merely 
representing simple features of the proto- 
music.
 Another example of externalism- friendly 
research comes from Sandra Trehub’s work 
on infant melodic perception (2000; Trehub, 
Bull, and Thorpe 1984; Trehub et al. 1987). 
Trehub investigated infants’ perception of 
musical stimuli (short melodies) as either 
familiar or novel—that is, how they perceive 
and remember information about melody. 
In a series of studies, Trehub and associates 
used an experimental design that involved 
infants being presented with a standard or 
original six- tone melody and then evaluated 
on how well they discriminated between 
different types of transformations of the 
original melody. Using this method, Trehub 
demonstrated that infants were crucially de-
pendent on global musical information, that 
is, information that persisted across various 
changes in qualities of the music.
 Since infants’ perception of melodies was 
holistically structured by global properties 
of contour and range, like Balzano’s work, 
Trehub’s research revealed that perception 
was crucially dependent on the pickup 
of certain structural relationships within 
music—melodic contour and frequency 
range are alternate ways of describing the 
pitch- time constraints. Only this time, the 
presence of pitch- time constraints so early in 
development provides especially compelling 
evidence of the perceptual importance of the 
musical invariants. Without time to learn or 
internalize the global information, the percep-
tual salience of invariants in music perception 
becomes quite robust. This work is a good 
example of externalist research because its 
methodology is explicitly world- oriented 
and committed to the cognitive importance 
of reliable, exploitative relationships between 
cognizer and environment. To conclude, con-
sider some recent philosophical theorizing 
about music cognition that continues further 
down the path of externalist commitment.
 Both Joel Krueger (2014) and Tom Coch-
rane (2008) have begun to explore possible 
connections between music and externalist 
thinking about the mind. Interestingly, both 
thinkers have approached music cognition 
from a similar direction, via the work of 
Andy Clark (1997, 2003, 2008). Like Clark, 
Krueger and Cochrane have been impressed 
by the observation that tight, causal coupling 
can occur between agents and their environ-
ments. Zeroing in on music, Krueger and 
Cochrane have each noted that similarly deep 
connections exist between agent and music 
during performance and listening. For ex-
ample, Cochrane writes: “If we consider the 
simple task of generating notes, it is clear that 
the musician’s interaction with his instrument 
allows him to do this. . . . [T]he particular 
way in which the notes are formed is a matter 
sensitively responding to the capacities and 
affordances of the physical object” (2008, p. 
333). It is from this kind of point that they 
have sought to connect music cognition and 
externalism.
 Both Krueger and Cochrane have claimed 
that, in virtue of causal coupling, music can 
sometimes extend cognition. For instance, 
Krueger writes: “[M]usic serves as an exter-
nal (i.e., outside- the- head) resource that can 
profoundly augment, and ultimately extend, 
certain endogenous capacities” (2014, p. 4); 
while Cochrane writes: “We may say that the 
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emotion is constituted by the entire system of 
bodily map in the brain, bodily actions, the 
activity of the instrument, and the patterns 
in the music” (2008, p. 337). The general 
argumentative strategy is to offer something 
like an inference to the best explanation. The 
view is that, taken as a whole, the evidence 
of music cognition suggests that music cog-
nition is extended. Explanations couched in 
terms of extended cognition offer the best 
account of music cognition research, or at 
least some portion of it.
 We think that Krueger and Cochrane’s work 
is an important first step toward connecting 
music cognition and externalism (see also 
Dawson 2013, chap. 6). Unfortunately, so 
far, these attempts are somewhat under- 
developed, and they remain open to recent 
criticisms from anti- externalists (e.g., Rupert 
2004; Adams and Aizawa 2008). This is be-
cause relying primarily on coupling consider-
ations leaves it unclear whether the agent/
environment should be treated as a cognitive 
unit or simply as just two causal interactors. 
In order to spare readers further rehashing 
of the debate over these kinds of concerns 
(see Wilson 2010, 2014), in what follows, 
we pursue a different strategy in connecting 
music cognition and externalism.
6. THE CASE FOR THE EXTENDED 
COGNITION OF MUSIC
 In section 4, we introduced two prima 
facie considerations for exploring extended 
cognition into the realm of music cognition, 
the first appealing to the notion of exploitative 
representations and wide computationalism, 
the second to the integration of sensing and 
moving through an informationally rich en-
vironment. And, in section 5, we provided a 
brief review of some emerging research in 
music cognition that gives at least a whiff 
of an externalist approach within the field. 
These considerations together form the basis 
for two distinct arguments for extended music 
cognition.
 Wide computational cognitive systems are 
systems whose computational processing 
extends beyond the boundary of the indi-
vidual cognizer. The articulation of a wide 
computational system parallels that for an 
internal computational system, and requires 
(i) identifying and formalizing specific prop-
erties of the environment that an organism is 
sensitive to, (ii) decomposing that environ-
ment into the parameters set out by the formal 
primitives, and (iii) specifying the algorithms 
or rules that apply to the identified primitives 
governing an organism’s behavior. The im-
portant point to note is that, while many of the 
informational primitives of the system will 
be internal, in a wide computational system, 
some of them are also environmental.
 Consider, then, what happens when musical 
invariants are taken as the primitive states 
of the computational analysis for music 
perception. First, the musical invariants 
can be identified and formalized as compu-
tational units, given that they are external 
information- bearing states. This is compat-
ible with musical invariants being inputs to, 
or alternatively parts of, the relevant compu-
tational processes, requirement (i). Second, as 
was seen in both of the two research examples 
in section 5, the auditory system is directly 
responsive to musical sounds; it responds 
as a function of the presence of external 
music information structures, for example, 
Balzano’s pitch- time constraints. This means 
that musical events can be decomposed into 
the invariant constraints, requirement (ii). 
And finally, there seems to be a lawful causal 
relationship between the physical structures 
of sounds, that is, musical invariants, and 
the stimulation of the auditory system, par-
ticularly the binaural system of the inner ear, 
requirement (iii). It seems, then, that all three 
of the above requirements for computational 
characterization are met.
 Given this, it seems that music perception 
can be said to involve computational pro-
cesses that range across environmental and 
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in- the- head elements. There is good reason 
to consider at least some aspects of music 
perception as part of an extended computa-
tional system. The point can also be put in 
functional terms: the musical invariants are 
used by downstream parts of the system such 
that they become integrated into, incorporated 
as parts of, a wide computational system. 
Call this the extended computational view 
of music cognition (ECMC).
 Perhaps more needs to be said about why 
the in- the- head plus musical invariants can be 
given a computational and even a representa-
tional characterization. There are two reasons 
to think this might be the case. First, the 
invariants persist through time; second, they 
have structure in virtue of which they carry 
information. As Piccinini and Scarantino 
(2011, p. 29) point out, as long as a medium or 
vehicle has persisting informational structure, 
it can be given a computational characteriza-
tion.
 Consider what Gibson (1966) says about 
texture gradients. Light is constantly diffused 
and reflected throughout the environment. 
Because of this, there are textures over-
laying surfaces. As perceivers move through 
environments, the amount of texture corres-
ponds to the amount of terrain. In effect, this 
means that, as the density of optical texture 
increases, the scale of the space is specified 
or revealed. Optical texture provides infor-
mation about the environment. Analogously, 
musical invariants such as pitch- time con-
straints have order and equivalence rela-
tions that remain constant through flux or 
transformations (see Balzano 1986, p. 227; 
or Trehub, Bull, and Thorpe 1984, p. 828); 
they have persistent structure. What’s more, 
music perceivers, as we have seen, resonate or 
detect the information contained or carried by 
the invariants’ persistent structure. For these 
reasons, musical invariants seem apt to be 
included within computational analysis; they 
are the right kind of external information- 
bearing states.
 In short, suppose that music cognition 
is a species of computation. As a part of 
music cognition, music perception involves 
the detection of musical invariants, and the 
interaction between the in- the- head part of 
the auditory system and in- the- world musical 
invariants is properly characterizable itself as 
constituting a wide computational system. 
Therefore, at least the perception of music 
is extended, and thus music cognition is a 
kind of extended cognition (see also Kersten 
2014).
 Consider now the second argument, which 
appeals to the integrated nature of sensing and 
moving in music cognition. This argument 
is a variant of an argument that Wilson has 
developed previously in the context of visual 
processing (Wilson 2010). It relies on premis-
es about the function of at least some aspects 
of music cognition, and how that function is 
realized through the active embodiment of 
the relevant cognitive processing.
 While it is a potentially misleading sim-
plification to talk of “the” function of music 
cognition, just as it would be of “the” func-
tion of visual cognition, in both cases, we 
can pick out at least some of the large- scale 
functions that vision and music have. What 
is vision for? It is for guiding an organism’s 
movements and actions by means of visual 
information. That is one reason why only 
mobile organisms have vision, and it suggests 
an intriguing hypothesis about the driving 
force for the evolution of distal sensing that 
Malcolm MacIver has called the “Buena Vista 
Sensing Club hypothesis” (MacIver 2009).
 But what is music for? Unlike vision, which 
has evolved independently multiple times 
in mobile species across widely separated 
phyla, the phylogenetic distribution of the 
capacity to hear or listen to music is signifi-
cantly more restricted, and the only species 
that music cognition has been explored in 
in any depth is our own. Moreover, music 
itself is a relatively recent cultural invention 
in the hominid lineage, and unlike vision, it 
APQ 53_2 text.indd   149 2/9/16   10:20 AM
150  / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLy
is at best controversial whether it is properly 
viewed as having any evolutionary function 
at all.
 Despite this, it is clear that music functions 
to elicit both emotional and behavioral re-
sponses in listeners and performers alike, and 
does so through the rhythms that it creates. 
More specifically, music cognition functions 
to initiate, exacerbate, and modulate human 
emotional states via rhythm, which in turn 
cause listeners to rhythmically move parts 
of their bodies: tapping, clapping, stomping, 
swaying, nodding, dancing, whistling, hum-
ming, singing.
 If we identify these as at least key func-
tions that music has, then we can distinguish 
two ways in which those functions might be 
realized. First, music in the world might sim-
ply serve as input to internal perceptual and 
cognitive processes, which in turn produce 
both emotional and behavioral responses 
through music perception. Second, music 
might be multiply sampled by perceivers and 
not simply produce emotional and behavior-
al responses but be cognitively processed 
through such responses. In contrast to the first 
“flow through” model of music cognition, in 
this second case, we would have a feedback 
model that incorporates the bodily activity of 
the listener as part of the model of cognitive 
processing. Here, music cognition is actively 
embodied, in that it is partly constituted by 
bodily movements, resulting in an integrated 
system that itself no longer ends at the skull.
 The recent work of Jessica Phillips- Silver 
and Laurel Trainor (2005, 2007) on the cross- 
modal interaction between body movement 
and the auditory encoding of musical rhythm 
in both infants and adults offers some sup-
port for the second of these two models of 
the perception of rhythm. Using ambiguous 
musical stimuli, Phillips- Silver and Trainor 
found that a perceiver’s rhythmic bodily 
movements influenced how they perceived 
that stimuli, aligning their detection of the 
rhythm with their own rhythmic movements. 
While Phillips- Silver and Trainor locate their 
findings in the embodied or situated tradition 
in the cognitive sciences (e.g., 2007, pp. 
543–544), like other proponents of embodied 
cognition, they do not explicitly view their 
research in terms of the extended cognition 
hypothesis.
 To see how one might move from active 
embodiment to extended cognition, consider 
what elsewhere has been called a “transient 
extended cognitive system” or “TECS” (Wil-
son and Clark 2009, p. 65), based on the idea 
of task- specific devices (Bingham 1988). Such 
devices are soft assembly (temporary and dis-
soluble) systems dedicated to accomplishing 
some goal. Introduced as a tool for thinking 
about problem solving in human action, task- 
specific devices are interesting in this context 
because they highlight how certain goals are 
achieved through integrating external and 
internal subsystems into larger soft assembly 
systems: TECSs (Wilson and Clark 2009, p. 
65). Such TECSs offer one way to model how 
cognitive systems might be extended.
 Return then to music cognition. We have 
already noted that music often acts via an 
external source that supports, sustains, and 
regulates emotional states through its integra-
tion with actively embodied systems—recall, 
for example, Phillips- Silver and Trainor’s 
findings about rhythmic perception and 
bodily movements. As an actively embodied 
process, music cognition regulates emotion-
al states through the integration not only of 
auditory, tactile, and proprioceptive inputs, 
but also with externally located musical re-
sources. If the function of music cognition is 
to regulate emotional states, then the resulting 
system that does so can be said to constitute 
a TECS that crosses the boundaries between 
both brain and body, and listener and environ-
ment. Insofar as emotional regulation stands 
as a good candidate for the function of music 
cognition, its achievement through bodily 
systems attuned to external musical elements 
offers one way to think about music cognition 
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as extended. In this respect, the functional 
argument we are making here has affinities 
with those previously offered, explicitly with 
respect to perception and perceptual con-
sciousness (Wilson 2010, 2014), and others 
less explicitly with respect to language and 
robotics (Clark 2008; Theiner 2011).
 Similar considerations also apply to music-
al performance, where the cognitive resources 
recruited from one’s environment are not 
only technological but also socio- cultural 
(see Wilson and Clark 2009, pp. 62–64). 
As anyone who has learned an instrument 
can attest, the developmental trajectory of 
musical performance often runs through 
music representational systems (e.g., standard 
Western notation systems), and such external 
systems function in cognition very much as 
writing and numerical systems do in other 
cognitive domains. Such systems crucially 
supply musical information to performers, 
in part by allowing performers to off- load 
the representational workload onto cognitive 
and bodily systems. As proponents of classic 
dynamic systems theory have argued (van 
Gelder 1995; Beer 1995), the basic biological 
systems often actively recruit external re-
sources into complex, non- linear interactions 
during performance in order to exploit the 
additional representational and computational 
potentials of those external resources. And, 
as more recent discussions attuned more ex-
plicitly to extended cognition have suggested 
(Chemero 2009; Palermos 2014), when this 
happens, the external resources come to be 
integrated with the biological subsystems 
such that it makes sense to treat them as one 
extended cognitive system.
 This doesn’t imply, of course, that per-
formers cannot also “internalize” musical 
representation systems; they often do. But 
when the developmental trajectory of musical 
performance runs through the use of notation 
systems, the resulting soft assembly system 
can be thought of as an extended one. The 
problem- solving context is apt for modeling 
in extended terms. In short, because of the 
way in which music cognition is often an act-
ively embodied process, it is also sometimes 
an extended one.
7. CONCLUSION
 We have tried to extend the recent explor-
ation of music cognition vis- à- vis the debate 
between individualism and externalism about 
the mind, both by locating influential work 
in music cognition within the tradition of in-
dividualism (sections 1–3) and by sketching 
arguments for extended music cognition that 
rely less heavily on considerations of causal 
coupling (sections 4–6). What we have aimed 
for is not so much a resolution of the issue of 
whether music cognition is best approached 
individualistically or from the perspective 
offered by extended cognition. Rather, we 
hope to encourage those interested in the 
general debate over the extended mind thesis 
in particular to consider music cognition as 
another domain in the cognitive sciences in 
which individualism is no longer the “only 
game in town.”
Carleton University 
University of Alberta
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